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A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE PROTECTION OF
CHILDREN FROM BROADCAST INDECENCY
EDYTHE WISE*
INTRODUCTION
In ruling on its landmark broadcast indecency case, the Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC or Commision) com-
mented that "to avoid ... overbreadth, it is important to make...
explicit whom we are protecting and from what."' The "what" is
broadcast indecency, which was not clearly delineated until 1975
when the Commission defined it as "language that describes, in
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary communica-
tions standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activ-
ities and organs, at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk
that children may be in the audience." 2 The Supreme Court up-
held the FCC's definition and, therefore, settled the matter, absent
future reconsideration by that body.
3
The Commission applies this definition narrowly.4 Neverthe-
less, complete certainty on what constitutes indecency is elusive. As
one court explained, the definition of indecency is inherently, but
not unconstitutionally, vague. 5
* Assistant Chief of the Enforcement Division, Mass Media Bureau, Federal
Communications Commission, Washington, D.C. B.A. 1960, Temple University;
J.D. 1977, Villanova University. The author would like to thank Letitia Wiggins and
Melody Proctor for excellent research assistance.
1. In re Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975), reh'g granted, 59 F.C.C.2d
892 (1976), rev'd, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978).
2. Id. In Pacifica, the court quoted with approval the Commission's statement
that the concept of the word "indecent" is "intimately connected with the exposure
of children to this language." Id. at 732. The Pacifica court continued by stating
that indecent language is distinguishable from obscene language because it need
not appeal to the prurient interest. Id. at 741.
3. In 1987, the Commission reworded the definition slightly by removing the
references to children. This does not indicate that the focus had shifted away from
children. Rather, it indicates the Commission's decision to consider separately
"the nature of the material involved" - i.e. whether it is indecent - and the time
a broadcast aired, which is pertinent to whether an indecent broadcast is actiona-
ble. Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Pa., 3 F.C.C.R. 930, 936 n.6; Action for Chil-
dren's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1338 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1988) [hereinafter
ACT 1].
4. See infra notes 50 & 126 and accompanying text.
5. ACT 1, 852 F.3d at 1343.
(15)
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Under the current enforcement standard, the Commission
seeks to protect children. Accordingly, indecency is banned only
when children are likely to be in the broadcast audience. The
times when it can be broadcast (currently from ten o'clock p.m. to
six o'clock a.m.) are known as the "safe harbor" hours. In contrast,
during the early years of broadcast regulation, the Commission
sought to protect the entire broadcast audience from obscenity/
indecency/profanity. During that time, there was no articulated
safe harbor, and acknowledgement of the need to balance the First
Amendment rights of the broadcaster and the adult audience with
the rights of parents and children was rare.
To say that the Commission administers indecency regulation
so as to protect children, while respecting the rights of broadcasters
and the adult audience, is not to say that indecency regulation's
issues have been resolved to everyone's satisfaction. On the con-
trary, indecency regulation remains the subject of vigorous debate.
Virtually every issue involved has been or is being appealed. The
continuing challenges illustrate the conflicts inherent in the body
of law involved. This Article traces the progress of indecency regu-
lation while acknowledging the remaining controversy.
Controversy complicates the law of broadcast indecency be-
cause such regulation precipitates collisions of apparently conflict-
ing constitutionally protected rights and compelling state interests.
The Supreme Court has held that viewing or hearing indecent ma-
terial, primarily a right of viewers and listeners, is protected by the
First Amendment.6 The Court, however, has also upheld the right
of parents to protect their children from influences the parents
deem harmful;7 affirmed the right of privacy in one's home;8 found
6. See Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744 (1978). For a discussion of Pacifica, see infra
note 18. See also, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (viewers'
and listeners' right to have medium function consistently with ends and purposes
of First Amendment is paramount to right of broadcasters).
7. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Yoder involved members of the
Old Order Amish religion and the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church who
declined to send their children to school beyond the eighth grade. Id. at 207.
Sending their children to school would violate the basic tenets of Amish life. Id. at
209. Citing the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Supreme Court said that
states cannot compel "children to attend formal high school to age 16." Id. at 234
(footnote omitted).
8. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970). Rowan in-
volved the mailing of unsolicited advertisements that the recipients found to be
offensive. Id. at 730. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's opinion stat-
ing that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague, thereby affirming the right of
residents to establish and maintain the sanctity of their homes. Id. at 740.
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2
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol3/iss1/2
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
a compelling state interest in the welfare of our country's youth;9
and upheld the government's authority to regulate "the content of
constitutionally protected speech ... to promote a compelling in-
terest. if it chooses the least restrictive means to further [that]
interest." 10
Conflicting rights and interests do not create the only problem
in this area. Part of the difficulty arises from the nature of broad-
casting."1 Unlike the print and motion picture media, broadcasting
does not provide a convenient means to protect children from in-
decency while simultaneously allowing adults access to it.
Beginning in 1927 with the establishment of the Federal Radio
Commission until the present, the Commission has tread with in-
creasing wariness through this legal mine field, seeking to avoid
trampling on conflicting rights while advancing the compelling
state interests involved in fulfilling its statutory mandate to enforce
the prohibition against broadcast indecency. Case by case, the con-
cept of indecency has developed from an amorphous generaliza-
tion poorly differentiated from obscenity into a concept
" 'intimately connected with the exposure of children to' " inappro-
priate material. 12 Likewise, the indecency enforcement standard
has shifted from a focus on the general public interest (with a spo-
radic nod to special protection for children and unconsenting
adults) to a focus on protecting children. To accomplish this by the
least restrictive means possible, the Commission, in compliance
with the courts, currently allows indecency to be broadcast only
during the hours when children are least likely to see it.13 Those
9. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968). In Ginsberg, a business
operator was convicted of personally selling two "girlie" magazines to a 16-year-old
boy. Id. at 631. The Supreme Court, recognizing prior authority, found that the
state has an interest in protecting the welfare of children and safeguarding them
from abuses which could prevent their "'growth into free and independent well-
developed men and citizens.'" Id. at 640 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944)). See also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982) (finding that
physical and psychological well-being of minor is compelling interest).
10. Sable, 492 U.S. at 126. For a discussion of the conflict between the First
Amendment rights of purveyors of constitutionally protected material and the pri-
vacy rights of unwilling recipients, see Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205 (1975) and cases cited therein.
11. Meredith C. Hightower, Beyond Lights and Wires in a Box: Ensuring the Exist-
ence of Public Television, 3 J.L. & PoLIcY 133, 175-86 (1994) (explaining nature of
broadcasting necessitates varied regulatory approach).
12. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 732 (1978) (quoting In re Pacifica
Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975)). For a further discussion of this case, see infra
note 18.
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hours are currently set at ten o'clock p.m. to six o'clock a.m.14 This
approach differs considerably from the approach taken by the early
Commission.
To put these events into historical perspective, the prohibition
against broadcast indecency, which is substantially the same prohi-
bition in effect today, was enacted two years before the stock market
collapsed, marking the beginning of the Great Depression. 15 The
section prohibiting indecency also prohibited the Federal Commu-
nications Commission from censoring broadcasters. 16 Apparently,
the legislators who enacted the Radio Act did not consider this a
conflict. Moreover, the courts, by and large, upheld this view, even
under a standard that today would be considered too vague.
Section 29 was adopted, unchanged, into the 1934 Communi-
cations Act as section 326.17 Under this directive from Congress,
the Commission strove over the years to resolve the First Amend-
ment issues involved in a series of cases, the most famous of which,
the "seven dirty words" case, was upheld by the Supreme Court in
1978.18
During the journey toward greater specificity, the rationale for
"who is protected from what" evolved through stages which can be
14. In 1988, the court noted that "parental authority is enhanced . . . if the
government permits programming at hours outside the workday hours common"
to the particular communities under scrutiny. Action for Children's Television v.
FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1344 n.21. See also In re Pacifica Found., 556 F.2d 9, 36 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (Leventhal, J., dissenting) ("[F]or homes where parents really care
about such matters there would be at least one parent in a position to monitor the
material heard and seen [in the early evening]."). However, in ruling on § 16(a)
of the Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-356, 106 Stat. 949
(1992), the court in 1995 extended the hours that indecent broadcasts are banned
from eight o'clock p.m. to ten o'clock p.m. ACT III, 58 F.3d at 661. In so doing, it
cited the difficulties even parents who are at home experience in monitoring chil-
dren's listening and viewing access to indecent programming through, for exam-
ple, a radio with earphones or a television in a child's room. Id. at 661.
15. Under the Radio Act of February 23, 1927, ch. 169, § 29, 44 Stat. 1172-73
(1927). Under the Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications Act of 1934, ch.
652, § 308, 48 Stat. 1084 (1934), the Commission was, and still is, obligated to
license broadcast stations to operate in the public interest.
16. Radio Act of February 23, 1927, ch. 169, § 29, 44 Stat. 1172 (1927).
17. Communications Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, § 362, 48 Stat. 1091
(1934). It remained there until 1948, when Congress, while retaining the Commis-
sion's, as well as the Justice Department's jurisdiction over the prohibition, trans-
ferred it to the criminal code. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1995). See also ch. 645, 62 Stat.
769 and 866 (1948).
18. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 738-40 (1978). In Pacifica, the
Supreme Court upheld the Commission's determination that George Carlin's
"Filthy Words" monologue, broadcast at two in the afternoon, was indecent but not
obscene. Id. at 741.
[Vol. III: p. 15
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roughly categorized into periods according to the group receiving
protection:
(1) "The Public,"
(2) "The Public," especially children and unconsenting
adults,
(3) Ambiguous
(4) Children and, possibly, unconsenting adults,
(5) Parents and their rights to protect their children, 19
(7) Children
20
The path the Commission followed over the decades, with
some detours, was toward narrowing the protected group and refin-
ing indecency's definition. It came progressively closer to arriving
at the least restrictive means to apply section 1464.
THE 1920s AND 1930s
In resolving early indecency and other First Amendment cases,
the Commission consulted non-broadcast cases, usually those in-
volving obscenity, indecency or profanity. Since no precedent was
directly on point, the Commission's task was to determine the appli-
cability of such case law to content regulation of broadcasting.
In Trinity Methodist Church v. FCC, a 1932 free speech case, the
Commission, claiming that a station's programming was not in the
public interest, refused to renew the station license.2 1 The issue was
not indecency. Rather, the programming at issue consisted of a
minister's broadcast attacks on, among others, the Catholic
Church, judges and the Board of Health. In upholding the Com-
mission's decision, the court drew a sharp line between broadcast
speech and speech in general, stating that the licensee's First
Amendment rights were not violated.22 The minister could con-
tinue to make the statements involved; he simply could not broad-
19. In response to Congressional action, the Commission proposed to enlarge
the category to include the welfare of all children and the privacy rights of uncon-
senting adults. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 914 (1992), vacated set for reh'g en banc, 15 F.3d 186
(D.C. Cir. 1994). Initially, the court did not uphold this approach. On rehearing,
the court continued to focus on assisting parents to supervise their children, but
also stated that the government's compelling interest in protecting the country's
children provides an independent ground. ACT HI, 58 F.3d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir.
1995). The court did not reach the question of unconsenting adults.
20. Id.
21. 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933).
22. Id. at 851. The court noted that the Radio Act of 1927, 47 U.S.C. § 81,
specifically allows the regulation of interstate commerce and that radio communi-
cation, broadcast speech, constitutes interstate commerce. Id.
1996]
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cast them.23 The court stated that refusing to renew a license of
one who has broadcasted defamatory and untrue matter does not
deny free speech, it simply applies the regulatory power of Con-
gress.24 According to the court, since the Commission is required
to grant licenses in the public interest, it is obligated to consider
the station's conduct as a licensee.2 5 The D.C. Circuit predicted
that if broadcasting such as that of Trinity Methodist Church is al-
lowed, "then this great science, instead of a boon, will become a
scourge .... ."26 Although it did not emphasize the protection of
children, the court did mention the Commissions's ability to take
action against broadcasts that "offend youth and innocence by the
free use of words suggestive of sexual immorality ....
Turning our attention to an early attempt to differentiate the
terms "indecency/obscenity/profanity," we find a 1931 case
brought under a charge of obscenity, indecency and profanity but
resulting in a conviction for profanity alone.28 Because the lan-
guage at issue did not arouse lewd or lascivious thoughts, the court
did not find it indecent or obscene. 29 Focusing on references to
"God," however, the court found the defendant guilty of profan-
ity.30 The court, thus, differentiated between profanity and obscen-
ity/indecency.3 ' Although it is not clear from the opinion whether
the court considered obscenity and indecency separate concepts,
apparently it did not. It is virtually certain that none of the partici-
pants in this case had a modern concept of indecency as "intimately
connected with the exposure of children to [patently offensive sex-
ual or] excretory activities and organs .... ,,2
In 1932, however, the Supreme Court provided some support
for regarding indecency as an individual, definable category, sepa-
23. Id. The minister's broadcast statements could be regulated. See supra note
21.
24. Id. See supra note 21.
25. Trinity Methodist, 62 F.2d at 852.
26. Id. at 853.
27. Id. The court also mentions the Commission's ability to take action
against broadcasts that obstruct the administration of justice, offend the religious
sensibilities of thousands or inspire political distrust and civic discord. Id.
28. Duncan v. United States, 48 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1931).
29. Id. at 132. The court stated that "while the language used ... is vulgar,
scurrilous, and indecent in the popular sense of the term, it is not obscene or
indecent within the meaning of those terms as universally applied in the adminis-
tration of the criminal law with reference to the use of obscene and indecent lan-
guage." Id.
30. Id. at 134.
31. Id. at 133.
32. In re Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975).
[Vol. III: p. 15
6
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol3/iss1/2
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
rate from obscenity and uniquely applicable to broadcasting. In
United States v. Limehouse,33 which dealt with the postal service rather
than broadcasting, the Court held the word "filthy," added by
amendment to the postal obscenity law, was a separate category
from obscene, lewd or lascivious.3 4 The Court defined it as plainly
related to sexual matters "coarse, vulgar, disgusting, indecent" and
relied heavily on the phraseology and position of the word "filthy"
in the statute. 35 The broadcast obscenity, indecency, and profanity
prohibition lacked similar alternate grounds for distinction. The
decision nevertheless allowed for an interpretation that "obscene"
and "indecent" differ in meaning just as the court made clear in
Duncan that the definition of "profanity" differs from that of "ob-
scenity" and "indecency."36 The Commission, however, did not fo-
cus on the distinction between obscenity and indecency in
broadcasting until the 1970s.
Meanwhile, late in 1937, shortly before Hitler and his troops
marched into Austria and Orson Welles terrified the radio audi-
ence with "War of the Worlds," NBC made news by broadcasting an
Adam and Eve skit with Mae West and Don Ameche along with a
conversation between Mae West and Charlie McCarthy.3 7 The
Commission, under pressure from Congress, wrote a letter repri-
manding NBC for programming "far below the minimum stan-
dards."38 It left indecency and obscenity undefined and did not
rely on the presence of children in the audience. The Commission,
however, did mention NBC's "moral responsibility for the effect
upon listeners of all classes and ages," and noted that the network's
broadcasts reached "men, women, and children of all ages." NBC
assured the Commission that in the future it would exercise more
caution and the Commission took no further action. One congress-
man, castigating the Commission as a "letter-writing" and "do noth-
ing" agency, joined the Washington Merny-Go-Round, which alluded
to NBC's alleged "cooperative friends on the Commission," in criti-
cizing the Commission's Chairman for not imposing a more severe
sanction.3 9
33. 285 U.S. 424 (1932). O.B. Limehouse was indicted for unlawfully deposit-
ing a filthy letter in a post office. Id. at 425-26.
34. Id. at 426.
35. The Supreme Court in Limehouse stated statute, 18 U.S.C.. § 334, made it
illegal to mail "every obscene, lewd, or lascivious, and every filthy, book ... or
other publication of an indecent character." Id. at 425.
36. Duncan v. United States, 48 F.2d 128, 133 (9th cir. 1931).
37. 83 CONG. REC. 560 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1938).
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Although, during this period, the Commission focused neither
on children nor on the rights of parents to protect them from inde-
cency, two non-broadcast cases were available as precedent for
channeling indecency to hours when unsupervised children were
not in the audience. Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., later cited in Pacifica
Foundation, presaged the Commission's later-channeling concept,
which was based on the "nuisance" line of cases, stating, "[a] nui-
sance may be merely the right thing in the wrong place, - like a
pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard."40 Another case, Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, affirmed parents' right to choose to send their chil-
dren to parochial or private schools. 4 1 Pierce thus established a pa-
rental right in controlling the children's upbringing.
42
THE 1940s
The end of the 1930s and the beginning of the 1940s saw sev-
eral important events in the protection of children as well as a
change in placement of the indecency/obscenity/profanity prohi-
bition. In 1938, Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act,
which, among other things, prohibited oppressive child (under age
16) labor and regulated the work of sixteen to eighteen year-olds.
43
In 1944, the Supreme Court, in Prince v. Massachusetts, found a com-
pelling state interest in the protection of children. 44 In 1948, Con-
gress moved the prohibition against obscenity, indecency and
profanity to the criminal code, thus requiring enforcement by both
40. 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). Thus, indecent broadcasts may be acceptable in
some contexts and intolerable in others. Id.
41. 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925). The Court stated that the Nebraska Compul-
sory Education Act of 1922 "unreasonably interfer[ed] with the liberty of parents
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control." Id. at 534-35.
42. Id. at 535. The Court noted that the state has no authority to demand
that children of the state be educated only through public schools. Id. Rather, the
Court said, "[t]he child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture
him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize
and prepare him for additional obligations." Id.
43. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-07, 212 (1995). Section 212 specifically discusses child
labor and was apparently meant to ensure that commerce is free from child labor.
Id. § 212.
44. 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944). Sarah Prince, aJehovah's Witness and mother
of two children, took her children with her to distribute pamphlets at night to
pedestrians on a street in downtown Brockton, Massachusetts. Id. at 161-62. The
Court stated that various situations, in particular propagandizing religious or polit-
ical matters, create difficult circumstances for adults and are "wholly inappropriate
for children, especially of tender years, to face." Id. at 170. The Court further
noted that the state has the authority to "control the conduct of children [and that
authority] reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults ...." Id.
[Vol. III: p. 15
8
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol3/iss1/2
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
the Justice Department and the Commission. 45 The 1940s also wit-
nessed expansion of categories of speech subject to governmental
prohibition. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the "fighting words"
case, the Supreme Court placed language that by its "very utterance
inflict[s] injury or tend[s] to incite an immediate breach of the
peace" in the same category with indecent and obscene materials.46
THE 1950s
During the era of McCarthyism and the Korean conflict, the
growth of television altered American popular culture. Along with
the recognition of television's power to affect children came efforts
to protect them from inappropriate programming.
One such effort was made by the National Association of
Broadcasters (NAB), a trade association, which in 1952 developed a
Television Code for self-regulation intended to meet children's spe-
cial needs.47 "[E]arly versions .. .forbade offensive language, vul-
garity, illicit sexual relations, sex crimes, [and] abnormalities
during any time period when children comprised a substantial seg-
ment of the viewing audience."48 While the Code was in effect, the
NAB responded to congressional concerns by revising it where ap-
propriate, giving its members greater guidance on violence or sexu-
ally oriented programming.
The most important obscenity ruling from the 1950s, however,
was the landmark case of Roth v. United States.49 Although the
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1995).
46. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). In Chaplinsky, Walter Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's
Witness, was distributing literature and denouncing other religions on a public
street on a biusy Saturday afternoon. Id. at 570. Chaplinsky's words eventually cre-
ated a disturbance to which the city marshall responded. Id. Chaplinsky ad-
dressed the marshall with offensive words, violating a state statute. Id. at 569. The
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Id. at 568.
47. United States v. National Ass'n of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149 (D.D.C.
1982). The Television Code sponsored by the NAB provided broadcasters with
guidelines for meeting their statutory obligations to serve the public interest. Id. at
152-53. All television stations were eligible to subscribe, with subscribers being
permitted to display the "NAB Television Seal of Good Practice." Id. at 153.
48. NAB TV Code, 95 F.C.C. 2d 700, 702 (1983). The Code existed until 1983
when its advertising limitations caused antitrust problems. See United States v. Na-
tional Ass'n of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149 (D.D.C. 1982). The government
charged that three types of advertising limitations violated antitrust laws: those
which (1) "limit[ed] the amount of commercial material which may be broadcast
each hour," (2) "set a maximum limit on the number of commercial interruptions
per program as well as on the number of consecutive announcements per inter-
ruption" and (3) "prohibit[ed] the advertising of two or more products or serv-
ices" in a single commercial less than 60-seconds in length. Id. at 153-54.
49. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Roth is a consolidated case involving two separate
violations of a federal obscenity statute. Id. at 479. In one case, Samuel Roth was
1996]
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Supreme Court had long assumed that the Constitution does not
protect obscenity, it was not until Roth that it squarely faced the
question. In holding that obscenity is not protected, the Court
noted that although obscenity statutes need not be perfect, they
must be applied narrowly.50 As the Commission would later point
out, however, the more narrowly the courts rule in finding obscen-
ity, the more explicit material falls into the classification of inde-
cency. Consequently, the Commission is faced with the task of
simultaneously preventing it from reaching children while not un-
duly restricting adult access to it.
5
1
As an apparent result of stations' adherence to the NAB code,
there were few Commission indecency prosecutions in the 1950s.
Nevertheless, in 1959, the Commission, in accord with the courts'
emphasis on the well-being of youth, acknowledged the special im-
portance of protecting children from indecency. It stopped short,
however, of proclaiming it as the primary reason for indecency reg-
ulation. The case in question involved an "announcer" at station
KIMN, Denver, Colorado, who made some unauthorized remarks
containing allegedly offensive speech, sexual innuendo and offen-
sive sound effects.52 The announcer spoke of flushing pajamas
down the toilet (with sound effects of a toilet flushing) and inflat-
ing "cheaters" with helium.5 The closest the announcer came to
uttering a traditional "four letter word" was when he spoke of "the
guy who goosed the ghost and got a handful of sheet."5
4
In December 1959, the Commission initiated a revocation pro-
ceeding against KIMN based on the broadcast,55 but stayed further
convicted of mailing obscene circulars, advertisements as well as an obscene book.
Id. at 480. In the other case, David Alberts was convicted for "keeping for sale
obscene and indecent books and with writing, composing and publishing an ob-
scene advertisement of them ...." Id.
50. Regarding the precision of various state and federal statutes prohibiting
obscenity, the Court required that "the language [convey] sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding
and practices . .. ." Id. at 491 (citing United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8
(1947)). The Court felt that the tailoring of the language in question was ade-
quate to establish "boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges and juries to fairly
administer the law . I..." d.
51. In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18
U.S.C. 1464, 5 F.C.C.R. 5297 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 Report]. See also Sable
Communication, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 132 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
52. Mile High Stations, 28 F.C.C. 795 (1960). Although the Commission
found that the incidents were unauthorized, it did not excuse the station's failure
to insure compliance with policy. Id. at 797.
53. Id. at 798 (describing nature of complained of remarks).
54. Id. The announcer, who was subsequently discharged, characterized the
remarks as attempts at humor. Id. at 796.
55. Hearing Designation Order (F.C.C. 59-1224) (Dec. 8, 1959).
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proceedings to consider a petition for reconsideration. 56 In 1960, it
replaced the revocation proceeding with a cease and desist order.
Commission Chairman Frederick W. Ford dissented over the Com-
mission's failure to revoke the license. The Commission, imposing
the lesser sanction, alluded to the protection of children, finding it
deplorable " [t] hat the remarks in question, which would have been
offensive in any context, occurred on programs in which young
people participated .. .
THE 1960s
The rebellious and eventful 1960s (the assassination of Presi-
dent Kennedy, the Beatles, mini-skirts, the "credibility gap," Viet-
nam on the televised news, "Hair" on Broadway, and "Who's Afraid
of Virginia Woolf" at the movies) brought change to indecency/
obscenity law as well as to American culture in general. Early in the
decade, a 1962 Supreme Court case, Manual Enterprises v. Dey,58 pro-
vided an early use of the term "patent offensiveness," which the
Court defined as "so offensive on [its] face as to affront current
community standards of decency . . . . 5 The Court used patent
offensiveness as a synonym of indecency, stating, "[t]hese
magazines cannot be deemed so offensive on their face as to affront
current community standards of decency - a quality that we shall
hereafter refer to as 'patent offensiveness' or 'indecency.' "60 The
Court stated that materials that are not patently offensive could not
legally be held obscene. 6 1
Of even more significance, in Ginsberg v. New York,62 the
Supreme Court upheld a state statute prohibiting the sale to minors
56. Order (F.C.C. 60-113) (Feb. 12, 1960).
57. Mile High Stations, 28 F.C.C. 795, 796 (1960). The Commission re-
marked that although the Communications Act of 1934 affords licensees wide dis-
cretion in program form and content, it did not believe that the Act was a sanction
for remarks such as used by the announcer. Id.
58. 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
59. Id. at 482. This case involved the mailing of magazines primarily contain-
ing photographs of semi-nude to totally nude models. Id. at 480-81. Parcels of the
magazines were detained by the post office awaiting determination as to whether
they were considered "unmailable." Id. at 481.
60. Id. at 482. For a further discussion of obscenity, see also Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (noting that federal and state obscenity statutes not
constitutionally offensive); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) (noting that
state ordinance requiring scienter for selling of obscene materials and imposing
strict criminal liability unconstitutional).
61. Manual Enterprises, 370 U.S. at 482.
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of sexual material deemed obscene to children. 63 The Court stated
that "a child - like someone in a captive audience - is not pos-
sessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presup-
position of First Amendment guarantees." 64 This concept of First
Amendment protected materials acceptable for adults but not for
children strengthened the Commission's basis for concentrating
the indecency prohibition on the protection of children from
otherwise protected materials. Applying this standard to broadcast-
ing, however, where indecency cannot be kept from children and
simultaneously provided to adults, makes such channeling difficult.
Ginsberg is also notable for a discussion of the potential harm to
children of permitting them access to pornography.65 The Court
acknowledged that numerous studies have failed to prove or dis-
prove harm to children from exposure to such material. 66 Writing
for the majority, Justice Brennan noted that Dr. Willard M. Gaylin,
of Columbia University's Psychoanalytic Clinic, reported that some
psychiatrists believe exposure to legalized pornography can be
harmful during the period while youths are developing sensuality
and control.67 The Court quoted Dr. Gaylin as explaining the view
of psychiatrists on permitting children access to pornography:
The child is protected in his reading of pornography by
the knowledge that it is pornographic, i.e., disapproved
... [t]o openly permit [it] implies parental approval and
even suggests seductive encouragement. If this is so of pa-
rental approval, it is equally so of societal approval - an-
other potent influence on the developing ego. 68
63. The Court defined minors as individuals age 17 and younger. Ginsberg,
390 U.S. at 650.
64. Id. at 649-50 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart also stated that be-
cause children are not adults and do not have the capabilities that are concurrent
with adult stature, they can constitutionally be deprived of other rights such as the
right to marry and the right to vote, "deprivations that would be constitutionally
intolerable for adults." Id. at 650 (Stewart, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 639-43.
66. Sharon Elizabeth Rush, The Warren and Burger Courts on State, Parent and
Child Conflict Resolution: A Comparative Analysis and Proposed Methodology, 36 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 461,468-69 (1985). The potential for harm to children from exposure to
sexual materials caused the Court to curtail the First Amendment rights of chil-
dren in Ginsberg. Id. at 469. For a further discussion of Ginsberg, see also Ann H.
Coulter, Note, Restricting Adult Access to Material Obscene as to Juveniles, 85 MIcH. L.
REv. 1681 (1987) (discussing paradox between material obscene to juveniles and
protected as to adults).
67. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 642 n.10 (citing Willard M. Gaylin, M.D., The Prickly
Problems of Pornography, 77 YALE L.J. 579, 592-93 (1967)).
68. Id. at 642-43 (quoting Willard M. Gaylin, M.D., The Prickly Problems of Por-
nography, 77 YALE L.J. 579, 592-93 (1967)).
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On the other hand, the Court recognized the lack of proof of inde-
cency's harm to children, but pointed out that such a connection
"had not been disproved either."69
Assuming that broadcast indecency harms children, the Com-
mission spoke of the need to protect "children and.., the emotion-
ally immature" from four letter words "and sexual description." 70 It
also ruled on several cases, issuing a final ruling in KIMN, and, in
1962, denying the renewal application of Palmetto Broadcasting. 71
Although the Commission had multiple grounds (misrepresen-
tation, loss of control of station, and indecent broadcasts) for deny-
ing Palmetto's license renewal, it stated that it could have justified
revoking the license on the programming issue alone.72 It claimed
that Palmetto violated the public interest standard by wasting the
spectrum on such programming.73 Thus, the Commission deviated
from the path toward narrowing Commission indecency involve-
ment to protecting children. Its reasoning evidences remnants, still
existing in the 1960s, of the Commission's identification of the gen-
eral public, not specifically children, as the group to be protected.
In some ways, however, Palmetto looked forward rather than
back. Foreshadowing the Commission's ruling in 1987 that innu-
endo made explicit by content is actionable, 74 the Commission
found that the Charlie Walker Show contained sexual innuendo as
well as coarse and vulgar language susceptible of double meaning. 75
Leaning toward a recognition of indecency as separate from ob-
scenity, the Commission characterized the programming at issue as
69. Id. at 641-42. The D.C. Circuit in Action for Children's Television v. FCC
cited Ginsberg for the proposition that the government need not provide "a scien-
tific demonstration of psychological harm ... to establish the constitutionality of
measures protecting minors from exposure to indecent speech." ACT III, 58 F.3d
654, 661-62 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
70. En Banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2307 (1960).
71. Palmetto Broadcasting, 33 F.C.C. 250 (1962), aff'd sub nom. Robinson v.
FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (denying renewal application of Palmetto
Broadcasting). For a further discussion of the case involving KIMN, see supra
notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
72. Palmetto, 33 F.C.C. at 254. The Commission stated that it regarded main-
tenance of "control over programming as a most fundamental obligation of the
licensee." Id. Failure on the part of the licensee to maintain proper control over
programming was "extremely adverse to the public interest." Id. at 255.
73. Id. at 258. The Commission stated "that this licensee's devotion of so sub-
stantial a portion of broadcast time to [this] type of programming ... is inconsis-
tent with the public interest, and, indeed, represents an intolerable waste of the
only operating broadcast facilities in the community." Id.
74. Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 2 F.C.C.R. 2705 (1987) (WYSP-FM).
75. Palmetto, 33 F.C.C. at 257.
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not violative of section 1464.76 Rather the Commission found the
programming unacceptable for broadcast because it was flagrantly
and patently offensive. 77 Thus, the Commission implicitly used a
combined "nuisance/privacy" and "public interest" standard for
finding such programming unacceptable. The Commission men-
tioned the "housewife, the teenager, [and] the young child" as
those who might be improperly subjected to the programming.78
Despite the apparent indecency activism indicated by the previ-
ous cases, the Commission, in the 1964 Pacifica case, rejected allega-
tions of indecency based on a Pacifica broadcast of Edward Albee's
The Zoo Story, a discussion entitled Live and Let Live conducted by
eight homosexuals, poems by Laurence Ferlingheti, a reading by
author Robert Creeley and a reading by author Edward Pomer-
antz. 79 The Commission, seemingly moving into a channeling con-
cept for protection of children, commended Pacifica for "[t]aking
into account the nature of the broadcast medium when it sched-
uled such programming for the late evening hours (after ten
o'clock p.m., when the number of children in the listening audi-
ence is at a minimum)." 80 The Commission noted, however, that
Pacifica acknowledged procedural errors resulting in the airing of
offensive words in two programs. Nevertheless, it gave uncondi-
tional full-term renewals to stations that had carried the programs.
The following year, however, when the originating station,
KFPA, was due for renewal, the Commission declined to renew for
the full term, but granted instead a short term renewal. In support
of its decision, the Commission cited complaints about KFPA's pro-
gramming and its admission that it had not always used the supervi-
sory policies and procedures on which the Commission had relied
in granting the previous renewal. 81
In a 1969 case that would prove significant in the 1970 Com-
mission rulings, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit ruled that the utterance of indecent or ob-
scene words amounted to disorderly conduct, punishable under ti-
tle 22, section 1107 of the D.C. Code, if the words either created a
threat of violence or were "under 'contemporary community stan-
76. Id. at 255.
77. Id. at 257.
78. Id. at 256.
79. In re Pacifica Found., 36 F.C.C. 147 (1964). There were three issues
before the Commission, one being allegations of broadcast indecency. Id.
80. Id. at 149. The Commission stated judgment as to the programs fell
within the discretion of the licensee according to the Communications Act. Id.
81. Letter to Pacifica Found., 2 F.C.C.2d 1066 (1965), 6 R.R. 570 (1965).
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dards,' so grossly offensive to members of the public who actually
overhear [them] as to amount to a nuisance."
81 2
THE 1970s
In the seventies, Congress banned the broadcast of cigarette
advertising; Watergate eclipsed all else in the news and the Vietnam
cease fire was signed. Substantial changes occurred in the broad-
cast indecency/obscenity area as well. The Supreme Court adopted
the definitions of obscenity and indecency still used today. The
1970'Commission decisions reflected the Supreme Court's in-
creased specificity as well as the country's cultural changes. These
decisions brought greater clarity to indecency law than had existed
in decades. Of greatest importance was the identification of the
protection of children as the rationale for indecency regulation.
As the 1970s began, complaints of indecency inundated the
Commission, Congress and broadcasters despite the continued
existence of the NAB Code. The decade commenced with two
Commission cases that had begun in the late 1960s. In one, In re
Jack Straw Memorial Foundation, the Commission issued a short term
renewal for indecency.8 3 The majority decision was less significant
than the dissents, which indicated that some of the Commissioners
were adopting a more analytical approach to indecency regulation.
Recognizing the need that context and standards be as objective as
possible, Commissioner Nicholas Johnson, in dissent, pointed out
that the Commission was dealing with an isolated instance and
neither got a transcript of the program nor attempted to apply the
statute. Commissioner Kenneth A. Cox, who also dissented, opined
that the term "indecency" was so vague it was unconstitutional.
The other carry-over from the 1960s, In re WUHY-FM, con-
cerned an interview with Jerry Garcia of the Grateful Dead.8 4 Mr.
Garcia presented his views on ecology, philosophy, and other non-
objectionable topics, but, apparently through habit, interspersed
his conversation with expletives. The Commission received no
complaints on this broadcast. Because of previous complaints
about the same program, however, they happened to be monitor-
ing the interview.
82. Williams v. District of Columbia, 419 F.2d 638, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en
banc).
83. In reJack Straw Memorial Found., 21 F.C.C.2d 833 (1970). The renewal
was contingent upon the station's taking appropriate steps to implement stated
procedures in selecting material for broadcast. Id. at 834.
84. In re WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970).
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The Commission used the broadcast as a test case. In the
course of its decision, the Commission touched upon many of the
issues relating to the importance of the protection of children, but
did not narrow the rationale to their protection. Rather, it spoke of
its duty to "prevent the widespread use on broadcast outlets of such
expressions .... ,"85 If newscasters, disc jockeys and other broadcast-
ers talked this way, reasoned the Commission, such programming
would undermine the usefulness of radio to the millions of people
who considered such speech "patently offensive."8 6 The Commis-
sion noted the passive nature of broadcasting, in which one is vul-
nerable to encountering offensive broadcast containing
objectionable language while dialing from station to station.8 7 It
compared broadcast with literature, which one must acquire and
read.88 Not unmindful of youth, the Commission added that "in
[the broadcast] audience [there]are very large numbers of children
... No one could ever know, in home or car listening, when he or
his children would encounter what he would regard as the most vile
expressions . "..."89
The Commission agreed with the defense that the material was
not obscene under the Roth obscenity test,90 in that it lacked
" 'dominant appeal to prurience or sexual matters.' "91 Citing
United States v. Limehouse,9 2 the Commission considered indecency
as separate from obscenity and defined indecency as: " 'patently
offensive ... and utterly without redeeming social value.' ",93 The
Commission imposed a $100 fine so that, on appeal, the court
would review and determine the standards for judging broadcast
indecency.94 The licensee, however, did not contest the forfeiture.
85. Id. at 410. The Commission stated this duty was triggered under the cir-
cumstances of the facts of this particular case. Id.
86. Id. at 410-11.
87. Id. at 411.
88. Id.
89. WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d, at 411. The Commission stressed "it is crucial to
bear in mind the difference between radio and other media." Id. (emphasis
omitted).
90. 354 U.S. 476 (1956). For a discussion of Roth, see supra note 49.
91. WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d at 412 (quoting Letter from WUHY-FM, Eastern
Educ. Radio, to FCC (Feb. 12 1970)).
92. 285 U.S. 424 (1932). In LimehousA the Supreme Court held unmailable
matter included "filthy" letters and writings deposited in a post office. Id. The
Supreme Court found that Congress intended to add "the filthy" as a new class of
unmailable matter. Id.
93. WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d at 413.
94. Id. at 415.
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The Commission's view of whom it should protect from inde-
cency was, at this point, ambiguous. On the one hand, it had iden-
tified the millions of people who would curtail use of broadcasting
rather than hear or view indecency as the group needing protec-
tion.95 In a sense, this amounted to a need to protect broadcasting
itself, which would lose its audience. On the other hand, it men-
tioned children and the rights of parents to protect them.96 It
seemed, though, that the Commission regarded parents and chil-
dren as simply a special part of the larger group.
Commissioner Cox, in a concurrence/dissent, pointed out that
the broadcast was between ten o'clock p.m. and eleven o'clock
p.m., its audience was primarily college students and nobody had
complained about the broadcast. 97 He disagreed that failure to
prosecute indecency would drive away millions of listeners.98
In a blistering dissent, Commissioner Nicholas Johnson ac-
cused his fellow commissioners of imposing their moral values on
the nation. 99 He said that the Commission actually was condemn-
ing "a lifestyle it fears because it does not understand." 100 He com-
plained that the indecency definition was vague and questioned
how a program about which the Commission received no com-
plaints could be considered "patently offensive."10' Meanwhile,
early in the 1970s, the Supreme Court made statements addressing
captive audiences, especially in the home. For example, in 1970, in
Rowan v. United States Post Office Department,02 the Court upheld a
federal law allowing individuals to have the Post Office remove
their names from the mailing lists of those who had sent them ob-
jectionable material.10 3 The Court rejected the claim that a vendor
has a right to send messages to those recipients who do not want
95. Id. at 411.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 418 (Cox, Comm'r, concurring and dissenting).
98. WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d at 421 (Cox, Comm'r, concurring and dissenting).
99. Id. at 423 (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting).
100. Id. at 422 (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting).
101. Id. at 423 (johnson, Comm'r, dissenting). For the Supreme Court's defi-
nition of "patently offensive," see Manual Enterprises v. Drey, 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
For discussion of Manual Enterprises, see supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
102. 397 U.S. 728 (1970). For a further discussion of Rowan and its facts, see
supra note 8 and accompanying text. See also Michael I. Meyerson, The Right to
Speak, the Right to Hear, the Right Not to Hear: the Technological Resolution to the Cable!
Pornography Debate, 21 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 137 (1987/88) (discussing Rowan and its
effect on First Amendment freedoms).
103. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 738.
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them. 104 As stated in Pacifica,105 the Rowan Court ruled that "in the
privacy of the home... the individual's right to be left alone plainly
outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder."
1 0 6
In 1971, the Supreme Court, in Cohen v. California, announced
that, "[t] he ability of government.., to shut off discourse solely to
protect others from hearing it is . . . dependent upon a showing
that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially
intolerable manner."10 7 It did not find a strong enough invasion of
privacy and reversed a conviction for walking the corridors of a
courthouse wearing a shirt bearing the message "Fuck the Draft."10 8
The following year, the Supreme Court decided a case that seems
only peripherally related to the subject at hand, but is actually criti-
cal to the narrowing of the Commission's and the Court's focus to
unsupervised children in the 1980s and 1990s. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,
the Supreme Court permitted Amish parents to curtail their chil-
dren's education at a younger age than state law permitted.10 9 Pa-
rental rights were extended even to generally unaccepted child
rearing practices. The Court upheld parents' rights to shield their
children from influences the parents consider harmful. Also in
1972, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit applied the law of nuisance to the utterance of coarse or
indecent language. 110
In 1973, the Supreme Court decided Miller v. CaliforniaI1 and
gave us the current definition of obscenity:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary
community standards" would find that the work, taken as a
104. Id.
105. 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978). For a discussion of FCC v. Pacifica Found., see
supra note 18.
106. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748. The Supreme Court, in Pacifica, applied this
reasoning to broadcasting, explaining "[b]ecause the broadcast audience is con-
stantly tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot completely protect the listener or
viewer from unexpected content." Id.
107. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). The Court stated that a
broader view than this would empower the majority to silence the minority on the
basis of personal preference. Id.
108. Id. at 22.
109. Wisconson v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). For a discussion of Yoder, see
supra note 7 and accompanying text.
110. Von Scleichter v. United States, 472 F.2d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The
court found a police officer had probable cause to make a disorderly conduct
arrest of a defendant, who, within earshot of pedestrians, shouted "fuck" and ran
from the police. Subsequently, the policemen, after catching and arresting the
suspect, found heroin. Id.
111. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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whole, appeals to the prurient interest,1 12 (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sex-
ual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law
and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.113
Indecency became identifiable as something separate from
obscenity.
In 1975, in Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC,1 14
which was an appeal of the Commission's decision in In re Sonderling
Broadcasting, Corp., 1 5 the court of appeals emphasized the signifi-
cance of the likelihood of children's presence in the audience to
the existence of a violation.116 The Commission had fined
Sonderling $2,000 for broadcast of a program, Femme Forum, from
ten o'clock a.m. to three o'clock p.m. 11 7 The program in question
gave "repeated and explicit descriptions of the techniques of oral
sex.,"118
Although the licensee did not contest the forfeiture, a public
interest group did. Consequently, the court of appeals handled the
case. 119 Had the licensee refused to pay the forfeiture, it would
have been entitled to a trial de novo. The court, however, finding
the material obscene under Miller,120 did not discuss the Commis-
sion's treatment of indecency, but did mention the likelihood of
children's presence in the audience.1 21
The preceding cases created a foundation for narrowing the
focus of indecency regulation to children. The right of privacy in
the home, the ability of parents to protect their children from ob-
jectionable material, the rights of broadcasters and their audiences
112. Id. at 24 (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972) (quoting
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957))).
113. Id. at 24. The Supreme Court rejected the test of "utterly without re-
deeming social value" as a constitutional standard. Id.
114. 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
115. 41 F.C.C.2d 777 (1973), aff'd sub nom. Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broad-
casters v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Commission denied Application for
Remission of Forfeiture and Petition for Reconsideration, except to extent it is a
clarification).
116. Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 405 (D.C.
Cir. 1975).
117. Id. at 400.
118. Id. at 401.
119. Id. at 400.
120. Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 515 F.2d at 405 (citing Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)).
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to free speech, and a broadening of the concept of "nuisance" as
applicable to language all coalesced to form the basis for the most
precise indecency ruling up to that time. This ruling came in re-
sponse to a complaint describing a situation not unlike those the
Commission had faced before.
Early on a Sunday afternoon in 1973, a man and his son, while
traveling in a car, heard a George Carlin routine entitled "Filthy
Words." The man complained to the Commission and started the
most significant case in broadcast indecency history. In 1975, the
Commission issued a declaratory ruling that the Carlin routine,
which, as its title suggests, discussed various "taboo" words describ-
ing sexual or excretory organs or activities, was indecent.
122
In its ruling, the Commission crystallized many of the concepts
that it had left unclear in earlier rulings. It was in this case that it
stated: "to avoid error of overbreadth" it is important to be explicit
as to "whom we are protecting and from what."123 The Commission
also said, "[t] he concept of indecency is intimately connected with
the exposure of children to language that [is indecent]."124 It
stated further that the material need not appeal to the prurient in-
terest to be indecent and that it cannot be rescued by merit when
children are in the audience. It defined indecency, and clarified
the difference between obscenity and indecency.1 25 Thus, the
Commission did not have to meet the Miller standard for obscen-
ity.126 Although it alluded to the desirability of warnings for uncon-
senting adults, it focused on children as the protected group. In
contrast with most Commission indecency cases, it attempted to ex-
plain why children should be protected from such material, claim-
ing that indecency "has the effect of debasing and brutalizing
human beings." 127
The Commission said that indecency should be regulated by
principles analogous to the law of nuisance where the "law gener-
ally speaks to channeling behavior rather than actually prohibiting
122. In re Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975).
123. Id. at 98.
124. Id.
125. Pacifica, 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975). For a further discussion and definition
of indecency, see supra note 2 and accompanying text.
126. Id. When the case was appealed to the Supreme Court, Pacifica argued,
unsuccessfully, that Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), indicates that
"indecency" and "obscenity" in § 1461 are synonyms. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726, 739-40 (1978). In Hamling, the Supreme Court, in interpreting the pos-
tal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1461, held the words "obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent,
filthy or vile" all mean "obscene." Hamling, 418 U.S. 87.
127. Pacifica, 56 F.C.C.2d at 98.
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it."128 Commissioners Glen 0. Robinson and Benjamin L. Hooks,
in concurrence, said, "the governing idea is that 'indecency' is not
an inherent attribute of words themselves; it is rather a matter of
context and content.
1 29
Shortly before, as well as during the pendency of the Pacifica
case, several other indecency related events occurred. With one ex-
ception, these did not arise from cases. In 1975, the Commission
dealt with indecency complaints about the University of Penn-
sylvania's station, WXPN. Its ruling, however, turned on the licen-
see's loss of control of the station, which in turn engendered the
complained of programming.130
Meanwhile, pressure from other branches of government and
the public influenced the importance accorded indecent broad-
casts. In 1972, the Surgeon General reported that television pro-
gramming has an effect on "certain members of society."131 In
1974, despite the NAB Code, the Commission received nearly
25,000 complaints of sexually oriented or violent programming.13 2
Broadcasters were also concerned with the number of complaints
they received. In June 1974, Congress, after five consecutive years
of concern about the effect of violence and "questionable" material
on children, "directed the Commission 'to submit a report to the
(appropriate) Committee by December 31, 1974, outlining the spe-
cific, positive actions taken or planned by the Commission to pro-
tect children from excessive violence and obscenity.' "133
In response to Congress' direction, the Commission released a
Report on the Broadcast of Violent, Indecent, and Obscene Material, in
which the Commission discussed childhood exposure to violence
and indecent programming.134 The Commission reported on stud-
ies of appropriate programming for children and concluded that it
128. Id. (emphasis omitted).
129. Id. at 108 (Robinson, Comm'r, concurring) (stating majority's reference
to nuisance is atmospheric, not substantive).
130. Trustees of the Univ. of Pa., 57 F.C.C.2d 782 (1975); WXPN, 57 F.C.C.2d
793 (1976) (applying for renewal of license).
131. See also NAB Television Code, 95 F.C.C.2d 700, 702 (1983). See generally
Hearings of the Surgeon General's Report Before Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. (1972).
132. NAB, 95 F.C.C.2d at 702 (citing Report on the Broadcast of Violent, In-
decent, and Obscene Material, 51 F.C.C.2d 418, 418-19 (1975) [hereinafter
Report]).
133. Id. at 702-03.
134. Report, 51 F.C.C.2d at 418. The Commission addressed a one-year study
conducted by the Surgeon General's office. Id. (citing Television and Growing Up:
the Impact of Televised Violence, A Report to the Surgeon General from the Surgeon General's
Scientific Advisory Comm. on Television and Social Behavior (1972)).
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could not prohibit violence because it is too difficult to define.1 35
As examples, it cited the scene in Peter Pan where the crocodile eats
Captain Hook and the scene in Snow White where the witch poisons
the heroine.13 6 Although it reported several studies showing harm
to children from viewing violent material, it assumed harm from
indecency.13 7 It expressed its intention to enforce the law against
obscenity and indecency, but also expressed its concern about sexu-
ally oriented programming that does not rise to the level of obscen-
ity or indecency.138 The Commission reported to Congress that its
Chairman, Richard Wiley, had met with broadcasting industry
heads, who agreed to self-regulate. 39
Chairman Wiley urged self-regulation because of his concerns
that government action to regulate sexually-oriented or violent pro-
gram content would violate the First Amendment as well as section
326 of the Communications Act.a40 On April 8, 1975, the broad-
casters cooperated by adopting a Family Viewing Amendment to
the NAB Code. 141 The amendment provided, in essence, that the
first hour of prime time would contain no programming unsuitable
for viewing by the entire family.' 42 Complaints by program suppli-
ers, however, led to charges that the Commission had violated the
First Amendment. 43 The controversy reached the courts, which in-
itially found that the Chairman had coerced the networks into
adopting the Family Viewing Amendment and thus had violated the
First Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act. 44 On ap-
peal the court concluded that the issues were properly under the
jurisdiction of the regulatory agency involved, and remanded the
question to the Commission. The Commission found that the
Chairman had acted properly.
135. Id. at 419.
136. Id. at 419 n.5.
137. Id. at 418.
138. Id. at 424-25.
139. Report, 51 F.C.C.2d at 420-21.
140. Id. at 420.
141. Writers' Guild of Am. West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1119 (C.D.
Cal. 1976).
142. Id. at 1072. The Family Viewing Amendment provides that:
Entertainment programming inappropriate for viewing by a general audi-
ence should not be broadcast during the first hour of network entertain-
ment programming in prime time and in the immediately preceding
hour. In the occasional case when an entertainment program is deemed
inappropriate for such an audience, advisories should be used to alert
viewers.
Id. (citing NAB, the Television Code 2-3 (18th ed.June 1975)).
143. Id.
144. Id.
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At about the same time, concerned with what it viewed as lack
of clarity in the indecency/obscenity/profanity statute it was re-
sponsible to enforce, the Commission attempted to clarify inde-
cency standards through new legislation. It proposed to the 94th
Congress that it amend the Communications Act to (1) include a
new obscenity/indecency section applicable to both broadcast and
cable, (2) delete the profanity prohibition and (3) rescind section
1464. 145 The Commission claimed that increasing numbers of com-
plaints of section 1464 violations had led it to examine the existing
statute and, as a result, find deficiencies. 146
The purpose of the proposed section was to remedy these defi-
ciencies in part by clarifying the term "indecency," the legislative
status of which the Commission described as unclear. The Commis-
sion also proposed to redraft the language to make clear that re-
strictions apply to one who disseminates as well as to one who
"utters" indecency, and to actions as well as speech.
Citing Ginsberg and Yoder for authority that the protection of
children from morally offensive material is more important than
the protection of unconsenting adults, the Commission proposed a
"variable standard that reflects this difference."' 47 Consequently,
the Commission recommended that indecent material be banned
only during those times that children are most likely to be in the
audience.14
8
The Commission offered several bases in support of these re-
strictions: making broadcasting a privilege; scarcity of broadcast
frequencies;149 a federal interest in broadcasting because of govern-
ment regulation of the spectrum; and the intrusive nature of broad-
casting.' 50 It pointed out that while intending to reach one group,
a broadcaster reaches all groups. 15' Congress did not adopt the
proposed legislation, leaving the Commission to continue case by
case resolution of those issues the legislation was designed to
clarify.
145. 122 CONG. REC. 33,359-364 (1976) (discussing repeal of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1464).
146. Id.
147. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638-43 (1968); Wisconson v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972).
148. 122 CONG. REC. 33,363 (1976).
149. 122 CONG. REC. 33,363 (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 376 (1969)). With increased information outlets, this factor has de-
creased in importance.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 33,364.
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Then, in 1977, the court of appeals struck down the Commis-
sion's Pacifica ruling. 152 The Supreme Court, however, reversed,
upheld the Commission and reaffirmed Ginsberg.153 The Court
stated: "[T]he broadcast media have established a uniquely perva-
sive presence in the lives of all Americans." 54 It spoke of "the pri-
vacy of the home, where the individual's right to be left alone
plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder."155
Continuing, the Supreme Court stated "broadcasting is uniquely ac-
cessible to children, even those too young to read."1 56 It upheld
the Commission's definition of indecency.1 57 The Court also held
censorship goes to prior restraint, not to finding a violation after
the broadcast' 58 Nonetheless, it emphasized the narrowness of its
ruling. 159
THE 1980s
Heeding the Supreme Court's warning that Pacifica is a narrow
ruling, the Commission, despite many complaints, interpreted the
case so narrowly that it found no broadcaster in violation again un-
til the late 1980s.
Then, in 1987, the Commission once more became active in
indecency enforcement. Its rulings immediately made clear that its
primary focus was on children. In April of 1987, the Commission,
in issuing several declaratory rulings, announced a new enforce-
ment standard: It would use the actual definition affirmed by the
Supreme Court instead of limiting its enforcement efforts to the
Pacifica "seven dirty words."' 60 Also, it warned that, although it had
previously considered indecent broadcasts after ten o'clock p.m.
152. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
153. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
154. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748. The Supreme Court noted that material broad-
cast over the airwaves enters into the privacy of the home. Id.
155. Id. (citing Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728
(1970)). For a discussion of Rowan, see supra note 8.
156. Id. at 749. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638-39 (1968) (dis-
cussing compelling state interest in welfare of youth). For a discussion of Ginsberg,
see supra note 9.
157. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 738-41.
158. Id. at 735.
159. Id. at 750.
160. See Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698 (1987) (KPFK-FM); Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 2 F.C.C.R. 2703 (1989) (KCBS-FM); Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 2
F.C.C.R. 2705 (1987) (WYSP-FM), reconsidered and clarified in part, 3 F.C.C.R. 930
(1987). The Commission defined indecency as language or material that depicts
or "describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities or organs ....
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 732. In so doing, it dropped the references to children from
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permissible, it now believed that after ten o'clock p.m., there was
still a reasonable risk of children in the audience in the markets
before it.161 In one of the cases involving station WYSP, the Com-
mission extended its enforcement beyond the explicit "dirty words"
to innuendo made explicit by context.162 In December 1987, the
Commission reaffirmed its ruling.'
63
On appeal, in Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACT 1) in
1988, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit noted
that the Commission stated as its purpose in indecency enforce-
ment enabling "parents to decide effectively what [indecent] mate-
rial . . . their children will see or hear."164 Consequently, it
remanded two of the cases, involving broadcasts aired after ten
o'clock p.m., to the Commission for development of a full record
on the channelling aspect with sensitivity to the constitutional pro-
tection of indecent material and its objective of assisting parents.
65
It upheld, however, the indecency definition and affirmed a case
involving the Howard Stem show, which aired from six o'clock a.m.
to ten o'clock a.m.' 66
In the aftermath of ACT I, Congress made a series of attempts
to eliminate or, failing that, minimize the "safe harbor" (hours in-
decency is permitted). In 1988, before the Commission could act
on the ACT I remand, Congress enacted a twenty-four hour ban. 167
Its sponsor, Senator Jesse Helms, emphasized that a total ban on
broadcast indecency is necessary because children have access to
radios and televisions at all hours.168 He argued further that the
presence of video cassette players and tape recorders enable chil-
dren to record indecent programming at night and replay it during
the day. 169 However, he also expressed the opinion that adults who
abhor such programming should not be forced to have it in their
homes either.1
70
the definition approved by the Supreme Court, but kept the concept that inde-
cency is actionable when children are in the audience. Id.
161. Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 F.C.C.R. at 2699.
162. Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 2 F.C.C.R. 2705 (1987).
163. Infinity, 3 F.C.C.1R 930 (1987). See supra note 74.
164. ACT I, 852 F.2d 1332, 1343-44 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978)).
165. Id. at 1334.
166. Id.
167. Pub. L. No. 100-459, tit. VI, § 608, 102 Stat. 2228 (1988).
168. 134 CONG. REC. S9912-13 (daily ed. July 26, 1988).




Wise: A Historical Perspective on the Protection of Children from Broad
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
40 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
Included in the legislative history is an opinion letter from
Bruce Fein, a former General Counsel for the Commission. 71 In
the letter, Mr. Fein expressed his belief that a twenty-four hour ban
to protect children from indecency would not violate the Constitu-
tion. 172 Citing children's access to radios, televisions and recording
devices, he claimed that a total ban on broadcast indecency could
be considered necessary. 173 Regarding adults' rights to indecent
programming, he stated that those who want to avail themselves of
indecent material can do so in theaters, nightclubs or record and
tape stores. 174 He also noted that Congress customarily passes con-
stitutionally uncertain laws on public policy grounds and allows the
judiciary to rule on whether they pass Constitutional muster.175
Neither providing support for nor closing the door on Senator
Helms' belief that adults should not have to be exposed to such
material, he pointed out that the Court in Pacifica had "left for an-
other day" the determination of whether the Commission could en-
force a ban on indecent broadcasts when no children were in the
audience. 176
The twenty-four hour ban became law,177 but was appealed and
stayed. Then, in 1989, the Supreme Court, in a case involving inde-
cency by telephone, restated the government's compelling interest
in protecting children from indecent material.17 8 Consequently,
the Commission requested remand either to develop a twenty-four
hour ban or to set channeling hours in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Sable.
THE 1990S
In 1990, the Commission issued a report on its investigation of
whether a twenty-four hour ban on indecency is warranted. 179 It
found that available data indicate that unsupervised children are in
171. Id. at S9913 (citing letter from Bruce Fein to Senator Helms).
172. Id.
173. 134 CONG. REC. S9913 (daily ed. July 26, 1988).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. (citing Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750 n.28).
177. Pub. L. No. 100-459, tit. VI, § 608, 102 Stat. 2228 (1988). The Commis-
sion promulgated the order to enforce the new statute, 4 F.C.C.R. 457 (1988).
178. Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). Specifically,
the Supreme Court found that "the Government has a legitimate interest in pro-
tecting children from exposure to indecent dial-a-porn messages .... " Id.
179. Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1464, 5 F.C.C.R 5297, 5298 (1990).
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the audience at all hours.'8 0 It also found that children from age
two until seventeen watch an average of twenty-six hours of televi-
sion per week, and that up to fifty percent have their own television
sets, while each household has an average of over five radios. 1,
Consequently it found a twenty-four hour ban to be necessary. 182
Addressing the definition of "children," an historically uncer-
tain area, the Commission surveyed federal and state statutes on
indecent materials. It also reviewed Supreme Court cases that
found a compelling state interest in protecting minors from inde-
cency. As a result of its research, it defined "children" as age seven-
teen or under.183 Despite the Commission's study, in 1991, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
invalidated the twenty-four hour ban.
18 4
In 1992, Congress enacted the "Byrd Amendment," prohibiting
broadcast indecency from six o'clock a.m. to midnight (six o'clock
a.m. to ten o'clock p.m. for public broadcasters that go off the air
before midnight).s185 Its sponsor, Senator Byrd, cited the findings
of the 1990 Report with approval, apparently concurring with the
Commission's definition of children.186 In 1993, the Commission
issued a rule implementing the Byrd Amendment. 8 7 The D.C. Cir-
cuit, however, initially rejected the Byrd Amendment, but, later, va-
cated the decision and set the case for rehearing en banc. 88
Meanwhile, the Commission continued to prohibit the broadcast of
indecency between six o'clock a.m. and eight o'clock p.m. in ac-
cordance with ACT I.
Upon rehearing, the court widened those channeling hours to
six o'clock a.m. to ten o'clock p.m., primarily because of the diffi-
culty parents face in limiting the programs to which their children
are exposed even when the parents are at home. 8 9 The court
stated further that it would not be unconstitutional to extend the
indecency prohibition to midnight if the ban were applied equally
180. Id. at 5297.
181. Id. at 5302.
182. Id. at 5309. The Commission concluded that the 24 hour ban "is the
most narrowly tailored means of protecting children from indecent material." Id.
183. Id. at 5301.
184. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 914 (1992) [hereinafter ACT I].
185. Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-356, 106 Stat. 949
(1992).
186. 138 CONG. REC. S7308 (daily ed. June 2, 1992).
187. 1993 Report and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 711; 47 C.F.R 73.3999 (1994).
188. ACT II, 932 F.2d 1504 (1991).
189. ACT III, 58 F.3d 654, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
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to public and commercial broadcasters. 190 However, since Con-
gress had ended the ban at midnight for commercial broadcasters
and at ten o'clock p.m. for public broadcasters, the court set the
hour at ten o'clock p.m. for both. 191 Although the court focused
on the rights of parents to protect their children from indecency, it
commented that the government's own compelling interest in pro-
tecting children provided an alternate ground. 192
During the 1990s, the Commission evidenced concern with
protecting children from other material, inappropriate even if not
indecent. It issued a ruling in one case involving graphic pictures
of aborted fetuses run in political "uses" during the day. 193 The
Commission, while declining to find such programming indecent,
advised licensees that, even though broadcasters are not permitted
to censor such advertising, it would permit them to confine the ad-
vertisements to periods when children are not likely to be in the
audience. 19
4
Congress, in the 1990s, has also taken steps beyond the inde-
cency prohibition to minimize television's potential harm and to
maximize its benefits to children. To help parents limit children's
exposure to violent programming without infringing upon the First
Amendment rights of the rest of the audience, it is considering sev-
eral alternatives, including use of a "v" chip, which would allow par-
ents to block violent programming. In 1990, to improve the
educational benefits of television programming for children and to
protect them from excessive advertising, Congress passed the Chil-
dren's Television Act. 195 The Act protects children twelve and
under from over-commercialization and requires educational pro-
gramming for those age sixteen and under.196 In enacting the Chil-
dren's Television Act, Congress stated that "children are this
190. Id. at 667.
191. Id. at 669-70.
192. Id. at 663.
193. Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, prohibits
broadcasters from censoring political advertising involving an appearance of
candidate.
194. See Letter to Messrs. Pepper and Gastfreund, 7 F.C.C.R. 5599 (1992) and
Letter to Daniel Becker 7 F.C.C.R. 7282 (1992), aff'd 9 F.C.C.R. 7638 (1994) (ap-
peal pending 95-1048 D.C. Cir.). It is important to note that the broadcasters did
not have the option of refusing to accept such advertising. Under § 312(a) (7) of
the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, broadcasters are required to allow
federal candidates "reasonable access" to air time.
195. 47 U.S.CA. §§ 303a, 303b, 393a, 394, 397 & 609 (1994).
196. Id.
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nation's most valuable resource, and we need to pay special atten-
tion to their needs."
1 97
Studies done both by Congress, in adopting the Children's Tel-
evision Act, and by the Commission, in promulgating rules to en-
force it, have demonstrated the powerful effect the broadcast media
have on our youth. The findings indicate that market forces, acting
alone, cannot prevent the deleterious effects of television and re-
place them with positive programming. 198 Although beyond the
scope of this Article, these studies reinforce the current focus on
children as a group warranting protection beyond that given the
adult audience.
CONCLUSION
Much has changed since Congress adopted the obscenity/in-
decency/profanity prohibition still in effect today. Even greater
changes are likely in the future.1 99 Although there are still subjects
of controversy, current recognition of the importance of defining
indecency and narrowly identifying the group to be protected has
considerably improved the Commission's ability to enforce section
1464 in a manner that is the least restrictive possible and that bal-
ances the right of privacy in the home, the compelling national in-
terest in the welfare of youth, and parents' rights to protect their
children with the First Amendment rights of the adult audience
and broadcasters.20
0
197. Children's Television Act of 1989, Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and
Transportation. S. REP. NO. 227, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 5 (1989).
198. See Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 10 F.C.C.R. 6308 (1995).
199. The internet presents challenges requiring a radically different ap-
proach to controlling children's access to pornography. One possibility is the use
of technology. As Commission Chairman Reed E. Hundt remarked at the Sympo-
sium sponsored by Annenberg Washington Program and The Children's Partner-
ship on May 25, 1995, a new technology, Surfwatch, uses "keywords and a database
of blocked sites" to "filter Internet pornography from children."
200. The views expressed in this Article are solely the Author's and do not
reflect those of the Federal Communications Commission.
1996]
29
Wise: A Historical Perspective on the Protection of Children from Broad
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
30
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol3/iss1/2
